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ABSTRACT: We propose a new approach to conditional donkey sentences that allows us to face successfully the often 
called proportion problem. The main ingredients of the proposal are van Benthem’s generalized quantifier ap-
proach to conditionals (van Benthem, 1984), and Barwise’s situation semantics (Barwise, 1989). We present 
some experimental data supporting our proposal.
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RESUMEN: Proponemos una nueva aproximación a las oraciones condicionales burro, que nos permite hacer frente con 
éxito al llamado problema de la proporción. Los principales elementos de la propuesta son la aproximación de 
van Benthem a los condicionales como cuantificadores generalizados (van Benthem, 1984), y la semántica de 
situaciones de Barwise (Barwise, 1989). Presentamos algunos resultados experimentales que respaldan nuestra 
propuesta.
Palabras clave: oraciones condicionales burro; problema de la proporción.
1. Introduction
Classical predicate logic and the philosophy that supports it have proved to be powerful 
tools in the task of analyzing how language works. Nevertheless, even the best tools have 
their limitations, and the predicate calculus is no exception. In Begriffsschrift, Frege com-
pared the contrast between natural language(s) and his proposed logical calculus to the con-
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trast between the eye and the microscope. Even if the microscope is indispensable for some 
purposes, some others require a wider perspective. First order predicate calculus has diffi-
culties accounting for the complexity of natural language(s). This is no news, but rather the 
background in which extended and non-standard logics find their rationale. Besides adding 
new operators or modifying the rules governing them, there are more radical ways of con-
testing the path that the predicate calculus has converted in the paradigm of logical reason-
ing. All the theoretical approaches that are nowadays classified under the general heading 
of ‘Dynamic Semantics’ have pointed out the difficulties of a static, satisfaction-based, se-
mantic interpretation of the predicate calculus in accounting for the subtleties of our actual 
use of language. Our aim on the following pages will be to focus on a particular kind of sen-
tences widely discussed by philosophers, linguists, and logicians for over fifty years, the so-
called donkey sentences. We will analyze one problematic case of donkey sentence, and will 
propose a fresh interpretation for it that will eventually allow us to face successfully the of-
ten called proportion problem.
2. Our Point of Departure: Conditionals
We focus on donkey sentences of the following particular sort:
1. Simple (indicative) conditionals. Woods (1997: 9-10) described simple indicative 
conditionals as involving an application of ‘If ... then ...’ to a pair of sentences, each 
capable of being used to make an assertion on its own, and each expressing as part 
of the conditional what they would assert on their own.
2. The set of antecedent occasions is not empty (the antecedent happens). In 1984 
van Benthem proposed to apply to the study of conditional statements the same 
methodological perspective that previously (cf. Barwise and Cooper, 1981) 
had been applied to study quantified sentences in linguistic semantics. That is, 
he proposed a generalized quantifier approach to conditionals (pp. 305-307). 
In this sense, “if A, (then) B; [is] regarded as expressing some semantic relation 
||if||(||A||,||B||) between the sets of antecedent and consequent occasions” (p. 306). 
An antecedent occasion (and analogously for consequent occasions) is an element 
of ||A||, being ||A|| the denotation of ‘A’. For instance, given the classical exam-
ple with which we will mainly work within this article ‘If a man owns a donkey, he 
beats it’, an antecedent occasion is a pair <man, donkey> such that the man owns 
the donkey. ||A|| is the set of all antecedent occasions.
3. The universe of discourse, E, is finite (||A|| and ||B|| subsets of E).
Our aim is to reveal some of the underlying mechanisms used in the interpretation of this 
sort of donkey sentences. For that, the main ingredients of our proposal will be the fo-
llowing:
a) We accept the generalized quantifier approach to conditionals, that is, our ac-
count will be provided in its terms. We have already noted the use that van 
B enthem (1984) makes of the generalized quantifier perspective in his analysis 
of conditional statements. In it, ‘if’ denotes a generalized quantifier relation be-
tween sets of antecedent and consequent occasions (p. 304). However, it is ob-
vious that not every possible relation qualifies as a relation of conditionality, so 
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the question is: What are the relations that do qualify? In order to answer this 
question van Benthem introduces which he considers to be intuitive constraints 
on the relation (pp. 309-315). It follows that, for finite sets, only three possible 
relations accomplish all the requirements: those that could be naturally called 
‘all’, ‘half or more’, and ‘some’ (p. 316). But this is an extremely restricted re-
sult which little has to do with the variety of accounts present in the literature 
on conditionals. In consequence van Benthem (pp. 318-320) proposes two ways 
out of the result, namely: i) the admission of infinite sets of occasions, or ii) the 
abandon of the intuition that prevents particular individual occasions from hav-
ing special roles. The enrichment of the semantic structure can be done in two 
ways: iia) the introduction of probability measures on sets of occasions (induc-
tive approach)1,2or iib) the differentiation of individual occasions through acces-
sibility and similarity patterns (intensional approach). The account of conditional 
donkey sentences that we are going to defend in this article can be framed as an in-
ductive approach in this sense. Hence the main ingredient that we will have to de-
fine throughout these pages will be an adequate measure of probability P. Using this 
measure we will calculate two relevant values: P(||A|| ∩ ||B||) and P(||A||-||B||).
b) We take seriously the active role of the agent in reading the environment 
(B arwise, 1989), i.e., we agree with situation semantics in that “[…] speech, writ-
ing, thought, and inference are situated activities. That is, they are activities car-
ried out by intelligent, embodied, limited agents, agents situated in a rich en-
vironment, an environment that can be exploited in various ways” (Barwise, 
1989: xiii). It is the agent who organizes her environment in a certain way, and 
hence considers some occasions more important than others. This idea will be 
present in our definition of P. We will provide here occasions with weights, and 
to do that we will need to take into account the configuration of the whole set 
of occasions. That means that in order to provide a particular occasion with a 
weight, we will first need to know what is the position or status of this occasion 
in relation to the others.
3. Our Point of Departure: Ambiguities
We can observe two kinds of ambiguities when we work with donkey sentences (see 
Bäuerle and Egli, 1985; Heim, 1990; Kanazawa, 1994; Schubert and Pelletier, 1989):
1. Existential and universal reading:
(a) If a man has a dime, he will put it in the meter.
(b) If a man has a dime, he will keep it.
The preferred reading of (a) is the existential reading: if a man has dimes, he will put at 
least one of them in the meter (not necessarily all of them). On the other side, the preferred 
reading of (b) is the universal one: as a rule of typical behavior, a man will always keep every 
dime he has.
1 Different occasions may have now different weights.
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2. Selective and non-selective quantification:
(c) Usually, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
We can distinguish here at least three potential readings of the sentence: (1) for most of 
the pairs <man, donkey> such that the man owns the donkey, the man beats the don-
key; (2) most donkey-owners beat all of their donkeys; (3) most owned-donkeys are 
beaten by all of their owners. In (1) we are counting pairs, whereas in (2) and (3) the 
quantification is selective. Here, the adverb ‘usually’ acts on, respectively, ‘a man’, and ‘a 
donkey’.23
The proportion problem arose when it was realized that in certain contexts or situa-
tions, respectable semantic theories, as it is the Discourse Representation Theory (DRT), 
wrongly interpreted (c) as (1), an interpretation that was not at all intuitive in the par-
ticular contexts. The problem seemed to vanish though, when the dichotomy selective/
non-selective quantification was pointed out. That was indeed an important step for-
ward, even though in our opinion the way in which selective quantification has been gen-
erally understood ever since is not the best possible one. In fact, the approach to donkey 
conditionals that we propose in this article, provides a different perspective from which to 
take into account both ambiguities. In the case of the proportion problem this new per-
spective yields a solution substantially different from the one generally associated with 
selective quantification. We maintain that our approach not only provides a new differ-
ent interpretation to the sentences, but also that our interpretation seems to behave bet-
ter in the sense that it provides more frequently the intuitive truth value of the sentences 
under consideration. In support of that we will introduce some experimental data in sec-
tion 6.
In section 4. we will briefly present donkey sentences, and the main difficulties usually 
attached to them. In section 5. we will expose the preliminary proposal which will eventu-
ally ease the introduction of our final proposal in section 7.
4. Donkey Sentences
Donkey sentences were introduced into the philosophical debate by Peter Geach in the six-
ties (Geach 1962: 155-156), a topic that Geach brings in from the Middle Ages, and since 
then they have been a field in which every theory of quantifiers and pronouns in natural 
languages has had to test its merits.
Donkey sentences have proved to be particularly resistant to logical treatment. Their 
trademark is the co-existence of logical operators, indefinites, and anaphoric links. One 
usual example is the one already mentioned before:
(1) If a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
2 Observe that there is no room for universal/existential ambiguity when the preferred reading of a don-
key sentence is the non-selective one. Observe also that (2) and (3) are selective as well as universal 
readings.
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We may refer to two main difficulties attached to donkey sentences:
a) The problem of the interpretation of indefinites. A quantificational interpretation 
of the indefinites is questioned by the presence of anaphoric pronouns outside the 
corresponding quantificational scope, which instead seems to call for a referential 
interpretation. Since the 80’s several proposals have emerged to combine and unify 
both interpretations (dynamic theories, arbitrary objects...).
b) The meaning of donkey sentences. As already mentioned before donkey senten-
ces are ambiguous, and the resolution of these ambiguities is not easy. In relation 
to the existential/universal ambiguity, for instance, its resolution seems to depend 
on two factors: “the initial determiner and world knowledge” (Geurts, 2002: 130). 
Observe that Geurts works mainly in his article with relative donkey sentences (e.g. 
“Every farmer who owns a donkey beats it”), hence that he speaks of determiners. 
In the case of conditionals however what we could say instead is that the preferred 
interpretation depends on the initial adverb (usually, seldom, etc.), if any, and also 
of course on world knowledge.
In this article we are not directly concerned with neither of these difficulties. Our work 
begins after the right reading (universal/existential-selective/not-selective) has been es-
tablished. Our concern is with the way of counting. How shall we understand a universal 
reading? And an existential one? Is the selective quantification approach as it is usually un-
derstood really a solution to the proportion problem?
5. The Proportion Problem. Preliminary Proposal
As we already said in section 3, the proportion problem arises when, in certain contexts a 
simple counting of pairs is used to interpret donkey sentences like the following:
(2) Usually, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
Take for example what happens with dynamic semantic theories like Discourse Representa-
tion Theory (DRT). This theory predicts that (2) will be true, given a model, if most pairs 
of occasions constituted by a man and a donkey where the first owns the second, have the 
relation of ‘beating’ between the man and the donkey. This prediction, says King (2010) 
(cf. Heim(1990)), seems to be intuitively false in the case of a model in which there are ex-
actly ten donkey owning men, where one man owns ten donkeys and beats them all, while 
the nine other men own each a donkey and do not beat them. Under the DRT interpreta-
tion, sentence (2) is true in the model, notwithstanding the intuition. The problem here is 
that the truth-value assigned to the conditional depends directly upon the sum of isolated 
occasions, something that seems clearly inappropriate.
What is the difference then with our approach? As we indicated in section 2., one fun-
damental feature of our approach is the assignment of weights to particular occasions ac-
cording to the configuration of the whole set of them. More precisely, for us a configuration 
is a set of very particular functions that we call relevant functions. Let us explain these no-
tions using sentence (2) as example:
(2) Usually, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
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A relevant function —for (2)— is defined as a function,
f:{x ∈ Man: ∃y ∈ Donkey & <x, y> ∈ Own} → {y ∈ Donkey: ∃x ∈ Man & <x, y> ∈ Own}
where each x is associated with y only if x Owns y in the model, and which is imposed to 
be as injective as possible. That means, in the case of (2), that each donkey-owner is asso-
ciated (through f) with a donkey that is not associated, if possible (see below), with any 
other man. Let us call Rngx the domain of the function f —the set of donkey owners in 
the model’s domain— and Rngy the codomain of f -the set of donkeys owned by a man 
also in the model’s domain. Finally, we call C (configuration) the set of all the relevant 
functions.
It is time now to introduce our preliminary proposal, according to which sentence (2) 
will be true if and only if:
(1) most of f : Rngx → Rngy s.t.
(2) <x, f (x) > ∈ Own &
(3) ∀v∀w [f (v) = f (w) → (v = w or (?a ∈ Rngy : <w,a> ∈ Own & ∀z f (z) ≠ a) ) ]
(4) most of x (<x, f (x) > ∈ Own → <x, f (x) > ∈ Beat)
Lines (2) and (3) define what a relevant function for (2) is. (3) makes explicit the idea of a 
function imposed to be as injective as possible. Finally, two quantifiers are here at work: one 
ranging over C (the set of all relevant functions) (1), and another ranging over the graph (set 
of occasions) of the different relevant functions (4).
Three observations
1. The first observation is in fact a clarification. We are assuming in this article an in-
terpretation of ‘usually’ as ‘mostly’. Of course, this is a valid assumption in some contexts, 
but not in others. The expectations of the speakers play an important role here. For in-
stance, it is not necessary to have a majority of vegetarians living in a country A in order to 
find people who plainly accept that you usually meet vegetarians in country A. It would be 
enough that these people come from another country B with a rate of vegetarians much 
lower than the rate of vegetarians in A.34In any case, this fact does not affect our reasoning. 
Remember what we said in section 4.: our concern is with the way of counting, a different 
way of counting which affects the way to understand, and thus to take into account, the 
ambiguities. Our concern is not with ‘how many occasions’, but with the way of counting 
these occasions.
2. This interpretation yields the intuitive truth value of (2) when it is uttered under 
the problematic context (T):
(T) 10 donkey owning men
(T) 9 men own a donkey each and do not beat them
(T) 1 man owns 10 donkeys and beats them all
3 We would like to thank David Rodríguez-Arias for the beautiful example.
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According to the just provided proposal sentence (2) is false under these conditions. There 
are ten different relevant functions f (f’ is one of them). Given a relevant function, the pairs 
<man, donkey> in its graph will be those used to evaluate:
(4) most of x (<x, f (x) > ∈ Own → <x, f (x) > ∈ Beat)
To refute (2) it is enough to observe that for any relevant function f there is only one pair 
in its graph such that <x, f(x)> ∈ Beat. Consequently, (4) is not satisfied.
3. This interpretation allows to distinguish between the following two sentences:
(2) Usually, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it.
(3) Usually, if a donkey is owned by a man, it is beaten by him.
(3) can be interpreted, analogously to (2), as:
most of f : Rngx → Rngy s.t.
<x,f (x) > ∈ Owned &
∀v∀w [f (v) = f (w) → (v = w or (?a ∈ Rngy : <w, a > ∈ Owned & ∀z f (z) ≠ a) )]
most of x (<x, f (x)> ∈ Owned → <x, f (x)> ∈ Beaten)
where Rngx is now the set of donkeys owned by a man and Rngy is the set of donkey own-
ers in the model’s domain.
With regard to the same context (T) under which (2) was false, (3) is now intuitively 
true. And again, our approach corresponds to intuition: there is only one relevant func-
tion f, and in its graph we can distinguish 19 pairs <donkey, man> of which ten are such 
that the man beats the donkey.
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So far, it could seem to the reader that the present proposal is just a quite unorthodox way 
of talking of the very usual idea of selective quantification.45The difference between active 
and passive that we have pointed out above, for instance, would be no more than a reflec-
tion of the more prominent status of one indefinite over the other during the interpre-
tation process, a prominent status that in our preliminary proposal would be peculiarly 
expressed through the selection of the elements of Rngx and Rngy. Take as example the fol-
lowing sentence (Chierchia, 1992: 121):
(4) Dolphins are truly remarkable. When a trainer trains a dolphin, he usually makes it 
do incredible things.
Given the more prominent interest of the indefinite ‘a dolphin’ over ‘a trainer’ in the sec-
ond sentence (the sentence preceding it being the reason), in our interpretation of ‘When a 
trainer trains a dolphin, he usually makes it do incredible things’, Rngx will be a set of dol-
phins, while Rngy will be a set of trainers. This would be just our peculiar way to express the 
prominence of ‘a dolphin’ over ‘a trainer’.
The question thus is the following: Is it really then the very same and generally ac-
cepted idea of selective quantification which is also into play in our preliminary proposal? 
The answer is no. Once the selection of the indefinite has been made, and that we have de-
fined Rngx and Rngy according to it, the treatment varies drastically from the generally ac-
cepted one. The proposal is in fact an essentially different and new one as we will see in the 
next section.
4 For an interesting discussion and proposal dealing with the proportion problem through selective 
quantification, see (Chierchia, 1992).
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6. A Better Approach
Is the preliminary solution that we have exposed in the previous section a really different 
and better one to the proportion problem? In order to answer this question we have run an 
experiment among two groups of students of the University of Granada (Spain). In the ex-
periment, we confronted the students with a written test56in which we provided them with 
the description of two particular situations. The students were asked to read the situations 
carefully, and after that to judge whether or not they considered a conditional donkey sen-
tence to be true in each one of the situations described. The first of the provided contexts 
(once translated to English) is the following:
Context and question 1:
You are visiting a small village with a very small population. Among them, 17 are men and all 
of them work the land with the help of animals. The 17 men are donkey-owners, and their rela-
tion with their donkeys is the following:
— 8 men own one donkey each. All of them treat badly their donkeys.
— Among the remaining 9 men, we can find the Sánchez, the Pérez, and the Martínez.
The Sánchez brothers are 2 and they have one donkey each (the donkeys are called Tim and 
Tom respectively), which also belong to their father. The two brothers treat well their respective 
donkeys.
The father of the Sánchez brothers owns three donkeys (Tim, Tom, and another one). The 
man treat well Tim and Tom, but he treats badly his other donkey.
The situation is repeated again with the Pérez:
The Pérez brothers are 2 and they have one donkey each (the donkeys are called Tipi and 
Topo respectively), which also belong to their father. The two brothers treat well their respective 
donkeys.
The father of the Pérez brothers owns three donkeys (Tipi, Topo, and another one). The 
man treat well Tipi and Topo, but he treats badly his other donkey.
The situation is repeated a last time with the Martínez:
The Martínez brothers are 2 and they have one donkey each (the donkeys are called Trini 
and Troco respectively), which also belong to their father. The two brothers treat well their re-
spective donkeys.
The father of the Martínez brothers owns three donkeys (Trini, Troco, and another one). 
The man treat well Trini and Troco, but he treats badly his other donkey.
Question:
In which concerns this small village, would you say that the following claim is true?
“In this small village, mostly, if a man owns a donkey, he treats it badly”
Choose the answer that seems more intuitive to you rounding only one of the two options 
that follows.
YES       NO
5 The original test as well as an English translation of the second context can be found in the Annex. 
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The general way to understand selective quantification together with the universal reading 
predicts the answer to this question to be NO: Out of the 17 men of the village, most of 
them, 9, are such that they do not treat badly all their donkeys.
As for our preliminary proposal, it predicts the answer to be YES. The reason is that 
the graph of the only relevant function here f contains 17 pairs <donkey, man> of which 
most of them, 11, are such that the man treats badly the donkey.
What about the other six pairs of <donkey, man> that we are not considering? What 
about the pair <father Sánchez, Tim> for example? Our approach predicts that this pair is 
not going to have any weight in the decision. Remember that our relevant functions are im-
posed to be as injective as possible.
Both proposals are clearly differentiated by the proposed context. Now, what 
were the answers of the participants? We asked the questions to two different groups: 
one (group A) in which there were 18 native speakers of Spanish, and another 
(group B) in which there were 35 native speakers of Spanish. The results we got were 
the following:
Group A Group B
YES 12 24
NO  6 11
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These results67seem to single out our proposal as the closest to the speakers’ intuitions. 
However, someone could still tell us that this is just a particular example. Maybe the usual 
way to understand selective quantification does not work completely well with universal 
readings, but what about existential ones? Let us consider for a moment the following ex-
ample (Chierchia, 1992: 130):
(6) Usually, if a man has a dime, he will put it in the meter.
Clearly, our approach seems to work badly here. What is the reason? Our interpreta-
tion provides a new account of the universal reading, but not of the existential one. 
Our problem then is to find a way to account for the existential reading in our formal-
ism. The answer is simple: In the construction of the set Rngy corresponding to (6) 
(Rngy = {y ∈ Dime : ∃x ∈ Man & <x, y> ∈ Has}) we will count all dimes had by the same 
man as just one (the one which will be put in the meter, if there is some; any dime, oth-
erwise). There will be then only one relevant function, and the interpretation will be the 
same one than the provided by the usual selective quantification.
7. Final step. Our proposal
At the beginning of the article (section 2.) we introduced those which we claimed to be the 
main ingredients of our proposal, namely: a) a generalized quantifier approach to condition-
als, and b) an active role of the agent in reading the environment. The idea then was to de-
fine an adequate measure of probability P in order to use P(||A|| ∩ ||B||) and P(||A||-||B||) to 
interpret the conditionals. The active role of the agent in reading the environment would be 
at play in the definition of P.
Our preliminary proposal has had a double role, that of introducing the tools we 
needed to define P, and that to ease the understanding of our final proposal. We said in sec-
tion 2. that in order to define P we would provide occasions with weights. To do that, we 
promised to take into account the configuration of the whole set of occasions. Well, the 
way we are going to do that is via the relevant functions.
So far, given the difficult case of a donkey sentence such as:
(2) Usually, if a man owns a donkey, he beats it,
we have proposed the following interpretation:
(2) is true iff
most of f : Rngx → Rngy s.t.
<x, f (x)> ∈ Own &
∀v∀w [f (v) = f (w) → (v = w or (?a ∈ Rngy : <w,a> ∈ Own & ∀z f (z) ≠ a) ) ]
most of x (<x, f (x)> ∈ Own → <x, f (x) > ∈ Beat)
Let us call this interpretation (I1).
6 Look at the Annex for a more detailed exhibition of the results.
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Now, our final proposal (cf. van Benthem, 1984: 322-326) goes as follows:
(2) is true iff P(A ∩ B) > P(A-B)7,8
where:
A is the set {<x, y> : x ∈ Man, y ∈ Donkey, <x, y> ∈ Own},
B  is the set {<x, y> : x ∈ Man, y ∈ Donkey, <x, y> ∈ Beat}, and
P is a probability measure assigning probabilities to set of occasions of A in the following way:
P(Ø) = 0,
P(<x, y>) = # G<x, y> / # G , and
P(A’) = Σ(<x, y> ∈ A') (# G<x, y> / # G),
where:
Ø is the empty set,
# expresses cardinality,
/ expresses quotient,
Σ(...) is the summation sign,
C (configuration) is the set of all relevant functions,
n := Number of relevant functions,
<x, y> ∈ A,
A' is a subset of A,
G is a disjoin union: G : = ⨿f ∈ C Graph(f) = {(<x, f 1(x)>, f 1), ..., (<x, fn(x)>, fn), ...},
G<x, y> : = {(<x, fi(x)>, fi) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n & fi(x) = y}.
The idea in fact is very simple: The weight of an occasion <x, y>, P(<x, y>), is the propor-
tion of times that <x, y> appears in the whole of graphs of the different relevant func-
tions. For example, if <x, y> does not appear in any of the graphs of the relevant functions, 
P(<x, y>) will be 0.
Let us call our final proposal (I2).
We can observe that (I1) and (I2) give the same answer to any of the examples so far. 
Hence the following question arises naturally: Are our preliminary and final proposals ac-
tually the same? It seems clear that if (2) is true according to (I1), then it is also true accord-
ing to (I2). The converse, unfortunately, does not hold. In order to verify this, it is enough 
to consider the next context:
— 2 donkey owning men
— One of them owns 2 donkeys. He beats one but not the other.
— The other man only owns a donkey and he beats it
(2) is intuitively true under these conditions. This is the truth value attributed to it by our 
final proposal, but not by our preliminary one. (I2) improves (I1). Actually, (I2) is the most 
accurate expression of the ideas already present in (I1).
7 Observe that the relation between P(A ∩ B) and P(A-B) can change depending on the initial adverb. If 
instead of ‘usually’ the adverb were ‘seldom’ for example, the inequality between the two probabilities 
would, at least, change direction (P(A ∩ B) < P(A-B)). 
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8. Conclusion
We have fulfilled our aim. We have proposed a new perspective from which the two kinds 
of ambiguities proper to donkey sentences (universal/existential reading - selective/not-se-
lective quantification) are given a new light. Our interpretation of (2) works, and we think 
that the main reason for that may be our resolution to take seriously the active role of the 
agent as perceiving his environment. The environment is not captured by the agent as a set 
of isolated elements, objects or occasions, but on the very contrary as an organized whole. 
The whole is really greater than the sum of its parts, and we think that it is necessary to 
take it into account if we are really interested in understanding natural language better and 
deeper.
Annex: test, results and controversy
You can find here the original test we used with the two groups of students, followed by the 
translation to English of the second context and question, and the results we got.
THE TEST
CONSENTIMIENTO INFORMADO
Gracias por tomar parte en esta investigación que se realiza auspiciada por el De-
partamento de Filosofía 1 de la Universidad de Granada. En ella rellenarás un breve 
cuestionario y responderás a un par de preguntas (duración estimada: 10 minutos). No 
se recogerá tu nombre, por lo que será imposible vincular tus respuestas con tu identi-
dad. No hay respuesta correcta o incorrecta. Simplemente expresa cuáles son tus intui-
ciones.
Te puedes retirar del estudio en cualquier momento sin necesidad de dar ninguna ex-
plicación. Si tienes cualquier pregunta plantéasela al experimentador.
Firma aquí para mostrar tu consentimiento a participar en este estudio una vez leídas y 
entendidas las instrucciones anteriores:
Ciudad: ________________________     Fecha: ________________________
Firma: _________________________
INSTRUCCIONES
NO HAGAS NINGÚN DIAGRAMA, DIBUJO O ANOTACIÓN
1. Verás que las preguntas que se te hacen van precedidas de un contexto que te sitúa en 
un lugar y situación muy concretas.
2. Lee el contexto con atención. Lee la pregunta. Vuelve a dar un repaso rápido al con-
texto. Responde a la pregunta.
3. Recuerda que no hay respuesta correcta. La respuesta que te parezca mejor, sea la que 
sea, es la buena. Tampoco hay trampa alguna así que no la busques porque no existe.
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No hagas diagramas, ni anotaciones, ni dibujos. Simplemente cuenta (si lo necesitas) y 
responde a la pregunta.
Después de leer esta página pasa a la siguiente sin mirar la que le sigue.
Firma aquí para atestiguar que has leído y comprendido la información contenida en 
estas instrucciones:
Firma: _________________________
Datos demográficos
Lugar y fecha: _________________________
Iniciales - Día de nacimiento - Mes de nacimiento: __ __ - __ __ - __ __
Sexo (Mujer u Hombre): _________________________
Año de nacimiento: _________________________
País de nacimiento: _________________________
País actual de residencia: _________________________
Lengua materna: _________________________
CUANDO HAYAS TERMINADO, DA LA VUELTA A LA HOJA. ANTES DE 
HACERLO RECUERDA QUE DEBES SEGUIR LAS INSTRUCCIONES DE LA PÁ-
GINA PRECEDENTE. SI NO LAS RECUERDAS VUELVE A LEERLAS.
Contexto y pregunta 1:
Estás de visita en una aldea con muy pocos habitantes. De ellos, 17 son hombres y to-
dos trabajan en el campo con la ayuda de animales. Los 17 hombres tienen burro y su rela-
ción con ellos es la siguiente:
— Hay 8 que tienen un burro cada uno. Todos ellos tratan mal a su burro.
— Entre los 9 restantes nos encontramos con los Sánchez, los Pérez y los Martínez.
Los hermanos Sánchez son 2 y tienen un burro cada uno (los burros Tim y Tom respectiva-
mente), los cuales a su vez pertenecen también a su padre. Los dos hermanos tratan bien a sus res-
pectivos burros.
El padre de los hermanos Sánchez tiene tres burros (Tim, Tom y un burro más). El hombre 
trata bien a Tim y a Tom, pero trata mal a su otro burro.
La situación se repite de nuevo con los Pérez:
Los hermanos Pérez son 2 y tienen un burro cada uno (los burros Tipi y Topo respectiva-
mente), los cuales a su vez pertenecen también a su padre. Los dos hermanos tratan bien a sus res-
pectivos burros.
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El padre de los hermanos Pérez tiene tres burros (Tipi, Topo y un burro más). El hombre 
trata bien a Tipi y a Topo, pero trata mal a su otro burro.
La situación se repite una última vez con los Martínez:
Los hermanos Martínez son 2 y tienen un burro cada uno (los burros Trini y Troco respecti-
vamente), los cuales a su vez pertenecen también a su padre. Los dos hermanos tratan bien a sus 
respectivos burros.
El padre de estos dos últimos hermanos tiene tres burros (Trini, Troco y un burro más). El 
hombre trata bien a Trini y a Troco, pero trata mal a su otro burro.
Pregunta:
En lo que respecta a esta pequeña aldea, ¿dirías que es cierta la siguiente afirmación?
«En esta aldea, mayoritariamente, si un hombre tiene un burro, lo trata mal.»
Elige la respuesta que te parezca más intuitiva redondeando una sola de las dos opcio-
nes que te damos.
SÍ      NO
Contexto y pregunta 2:
Nos encontramos ahora en otra aldea, también con muy pocos habitantes. De ellos, 
como antes, 17 son hombres y todos trabajan en el campo con la ayuda de animales. Los 
17 hombres tienen cada uno 5 burros y su relación con ellos es la siguiente:
Todos los hombres tratan mal a uno de sus burros y bien a los restantes.
Pregunta:
En lo que respecta a esta pequeña aldea, ¿dirías que es cierta la siguiente afirmación?
«En esta aldea, mayoritariamente, si un hombre tiene un burro, lo trata mal.»
Elige la respuesta que te parezca más intuitiva redondeando una sola de las dos opcio-
nes que te damos.
SÍ      NO
TRANSLATION OF THE SECOND CONTEXT
Context and question 2:
We are now in another village, also with a very small population. Among them, as be-
fore, 17 are men and all of them work the land with the help of animals. The 17 men have 
5 donkeys each, and their relation with their donkeys is the following:
All men treat badly one of their donkeys, and well the others.
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Question:
In which concerns this small village, would you say that the following claim is true?
“In this small village, mostly, if a man owns a donkey, he treats it badly”
Choose the answer that seems more intuitive to you rounding only one of the two op-
tions that follows.
YES      NO
THE RESULTS
Context and question 1: Context and question 2:
Group A Group B Group A Group B
YES 12 24 YES  5 15
NO  6 11 NO 13 20
Group A Group B
Answer to question 1: YES
Answer to question 2: NO 8 15
Answer to question 1: YES
Answer to question 2: YES 4  9
Answer to question 1: NO
Answer to question 2: YES 1  6
Answer to question 1: NO
Answer to question 2: NO 5  5
Observation: In our experiment we assumed that the intuitive reading of the sentence 
in the proposed context was the universal one. However even though the data seem mostly 
to confirm the hypothesis, we can still find participants who seem to make an existential in-
terpretation of the sentence. This is something important to realize indeed, but it does not 
suppose, we think, a problem for our main conclusion in this article. To justify this claim it 
is enough to have a look at the following table, where we can find the predicted answers by 
the different approaches to questions 1 and 2 (answer to question 1 / answer to question 2) 
under a universal and existential reading:
Approach
Preferred reading
Universal Existential
Our approach YES / NO YES / YES
The (usual) selective quantification approach NO / NO YES / YES
The non-selective quantification approach NO / NO(Remember footnote 2)
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If we focus among our participants on those who (given the data) may have preferred a 
universal reading, this is the new table we get:
Group A Group B
Answer to question 1: YES
Answer to question 2: NO 8 15
Answer to question 1: NO
Answer to question 2: NO 5  5
The results seem still to support our approach as the closest one to the intuitions of the 
speakers.
THE CONTROVERSY
Probably, the most controversial point about our interpretation of the results, as Re-
viewer A let us note, rests on our assumption that subjects will use the same reading of the 
sentence (universal or existential) for judging both questions. This assumption seem to make 
us difficult to explain the pattern NO / YES of answer that we also obtained in our results.
In section 4 above, we decided to take Geurts (2002) as our main reference in which 
concerns the existential/universal ambiguity, thus claiming that the preferred interpreta-
tion of a conditional donkey sentence depends on the initial adverb (mostly, seldom, etc.) 
and on world knowledge (what we know, for example, about donkeys, men, about the life 
in a small village, etc.). In our experiment, we tried to design the two situations and ques-
tions in such a way that would fix both variables. So, given a particular subject, his preferred 
reading in both cases was expected to be the same.
What happened then with those subjects who answered NO / YES to the questions? 
The total of subjects who answered the questions following this pattern where 7 out of 53. 
We do not have a definitive answer here, but one possibility at least to have in mind is that 
given the difficulty of the first context, these participants just decided to answer randomly 
to the questions.
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